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Abstract
We endogenize circulation of currencies and price formation in a decentralized monetary trading environment
with two countries and two currencies. In equilibrium sellers of homogenous goods may post prices in the
national or also in the foreign currency, given unobservable buyers’ valuations. We prove that, under diﬀerent
monetary regimes, the absence of well integrated international goods markets doesn’t necessarily imply a
violation of the law of one price. We also illustrate the behavior of prices across regimes characterized by
diﬀerent degrees of monetary integration.
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1. Introduction
An old economic tenet maintains that, absent restrictions on goods arbitrage, the equilibrium
prices of a good sold on perfectly competitive foreign and domestic markets should be identical once
converted to a common currency. Empirical evidence challenges models of international trade based
on this equilibrium view, by pointing to the general failure of the law of one price at most disaggregated product levels, with few exceptions (see the survey of Rogoﬀ, 1996). A common explanation
is that international goods markets are not nearly as integrated as domestic markets. Trading
frictions, such as transportation or information costs, may act as impediments for international
commodity arbitrage, aﬀecting the international ßow of goods and relative prices.
We develop a theoretical study of decentralized monetary exchange in a two-country setting
where trading diﬃculties are made explicit, and currencies’ values are endogenously determined.
Our goal is to examine the theoretical implications of the absence of well integrated international
goods markets on domestic and foreign prices of homogeneous traded goods. We ask if international
trading frictions are suﬃcient to account for the startling empirical failure of the law of one price.
We provide a negative answer, by means of rigorous theoretical examples. To do so we study the
pricing behavior of domestic and foreign sellers, and endogenize the currencies’ circulation patterns.
When is it advantageous to post prices in a foreign as well as a domestic money? How would their
purchasing powers compare? Would prices be lower?
Our analysis is developed within the framework of a recent theoretical literature in which
money has an explicit role as a medium of exchange. We build a general equilibrium decentralized
international trading environment where the absence of well integrated markets is modeled by
representing trade as a random search process. As a result, inconvertible and intrinsically worthless
monies have value in equilibrium if they can facilitate the spot exchange of goods whose consumption
generates utility.2
Several reasons suggest this modeling avenue. First, it is a natural way to make explicit the
link between exchange frictions and relative prices, but also trade ßows (as noted by Rauch, 1999).
Second, the use of a theoretical framework where trade is multilateral and centralized would not give
satisfactory account of the relation between the monetary system in use and the price mechanism
2
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(Hellwig, 1993). Third, we want to study equilibrium use of a currency as the result of decentralized
and uncoordinated private decisions, and not of government action.
To make the theoretical implications transparent, we consider a setting that abstracts from
sophisticated Þnancial markets or trade intermediaries. There are two countries with immobile
factors of production, distinct currencies, and heterogeneous trading environments. Due to specialization in production and tastes, agents must trade locally or internationally to consume. This
process is subject to spatial and informational frictions, with international trade more diﬃcult than
local. Buyers are randomly paired to sellers, and maximize expected utility by choosing when to
spend their money. Sellers maximize proÞts by choosing the money they accept and the prices to
post in their store, given that buyers’ preferences and nationality are unobservable. The countries’
heterogeneity and the trade frictions may induce price disparity across economies.
Our main contribution is to prove that the absence of well integrated international goods markets does not per se imply a violation of the law of one price. In fact, despite the presence of
international trade frictions, equilibria exist where local stores accept a foreign currency and prices
in that money are identical across countries. We show that this result holds under diﬀerent monetary regimes in which the two monies may or may not compete as international media of exchange.
Our analysis also suggests that the use of a foreign money for internal trade (often referred to
as ‘currency substitution’) is associated with scarcity of liquidity. When a foreign currency complements the domestic money as means of payment, this tends to improve the functioning of the
domestic economy by supporting more eﬃcient spot exchange. While this may beneÞt the domestic
economy, by lowering prices, it may hurt the foreign economy if it experiences a liquidity drain, as
a result.
This study makes a further contribution. By adopting a seller-posting-price protocol, we extend
prior work on existence of monetary equilibria in divisible-goods versions of the search-theoretic
model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), when price formation is endogenous.3 We prove that symmetric monetary equilibria in pure strategies exist only if the money stock is neither excessive nor
too limited (i.e. sales opportunities are neither infrequent, nor plentiful), and agents are suﬃciently
patient. Otherwise, sellers would post the highest reservation price, depriving money of value.
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2. Environment
The model is a divisible-goods version of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). Time is continuous and
goes on forever. There is a continuum of individuals and goods, normalized to one, belonging to one
of two countries identiÞed by d ∈ {D, F }. A fraction P < 1 of individuals belongs to the domestic
economy, D, and 1 − P live in the foreign economy, F . In each country there are N ≥ 3 types of
agents and N types of goods, each in proportion

1
N.

Let i ∈ N ≡ {1, .., N} denote an individual

type, and let n ∈ N denote a good type.
Individuals derive diﬀerent utility from diﬀerent good types, having homogeneous cardinal preferences, but heterogeneous ordinal preferences over goods types. Preferences for good n = i + i0 of
an agent of type i are monotonically decreasing in i0 ∈ {0, .., N − 1} , where n is modulo N. Thus,
the distribution over the rank ordering of good types is uniform and symmetric across countries
and individual types, and a proportion 1/N of agents likes any good i the most in each country.4
We let the temporary utility of agent i from consumption of q units of good n take the form
ui (qn ) = (qai,n )γ with γ ∈ (0, 1), ai,n = ai+1,n+1 ∀i, n (mod. N), and 1 = ai,i > ai,i+1 > ...ai,N >
...ai,i−1 = 0 ∀i (mod. N). Hence, agent i has greater valuation for good n than agent j if ai,n > aj,n ,
and own production does not provide utility. The future is discounted at rate r > 0.
A fraction M ∈ (0, 1) of the population is initially randomly endowed with one unit of indivisible
Þat money, domestic or foreign. We denote the initial supply of domestic (resp. foreign) currency
by MD (resp. MF ), thus
MD + MF = M.

(1)

The 1 − M fraction of individuals who start life without money is endowed with a production
opportunity. This allows an agent of type i to produce q ≥ 0 units of a perishable and homogeneous
good of type i − 1 (mod. N) suﬀering disutility c(q) = q. A new production opportunity freely
arises following consumption. Thus, we call ‘buyers’ the agents with money, and ‘sellers’ the others.
For simplicity we assume that buyers search for sellers who are located at Þxed points, and are
paired randomly at each date according to the following Poisson process. Domestic agents meet
each other at rate αD = P k, and meet a foreign agent at rate αF = (1 − P )k0 . Foreign agents meet
4
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3

each other at rate α0F = (1 − P )k, and meet a domestic agent at rate α0D = P k0 . The parameter

k0 > 0 denotes the degree of economic integration between countries, while k > 0 determines the
matching rate within a country.5 This speciÞcation implies that the total number of meetings that
the domestic population has with foreigners, P αF , is identical to the total number of meetings that
the foreign population has with domestic agents, (1 − P )α0D .
Consider a match. It is assumed that money and output type are observable, but not preferences
and nationality. Trade histories are private information, agents cannot commit to future actions,
and transfers cannot be enforced. The trading mechanism is as follows. If a seller chooses to trade,
he gets to ‘post’ the price, i.e. he makes an oﬀer that the buyer can only accept or reject. If
disagreement results, no trade takes place. Posting a price is costly for the seller, as he suﬀers small
disutility from doing so. This is small, however, in that we consider the limiting case where this
disutility goes to zero.
The assumptions made keep the model tractable without sacriÞcing the rigorousness of the
analysis. SpeciÞcally, preference and technologies motivate the existence of specialization in production and consumption, and of gains from trade. The information, commitment, and enforcement
limitations rule out intertemporal trade and imply that spot trade must be facilitated by media of
exchange. The assumed matching process allows us to focus solely on trades of goods for money.
This, together with the assumed production technology and money indivisibility, allows us to avoid
tracking complex distributions of nominal balances (e.g. Green and Zhou, 1998, or Camera and
Corbae, 1999). Finally, the trading mechanism adopted is motivated by the ordinary observation
that in retail transactions stores post prices.
3. Symmetric Stationary Equilibria with Homogeneous Prices
We focus on stationary and symmetric Nash monetary equilibria, where distributions are stationary and agents who are in an identical state adopt identical, time-invariant strategies. In
equilibrium, actions are individually optimal, and based on the correct evaluation of exchange
opportunities and gains from trade.
Consider a representative domestic agent of type i (foreigners are not discussed, if the implica5

Much as in Matsuyama et al. (1993), these parameters control national/international trade frictions. We can

choose P , k, and k0 so that, for instance, αD > αF and α0F > α0D , i.e. international trade is more diﬃcult than local,
in both economies, or αF 6= α0D , i.e. international matching rates diﬀer across countries.
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tions are understood). At each date, he can be a buyer or a seller who selects actions to maximize
her expected lifetime utility, taking as given strategies of others, trade opportunities, and market
prices.
As a seller, the agent’s strategy encompasses two choices: whether to pursue a trade for a given
currency and, contingent on that, the price(s) to be posted. For ease of exposition we break her
problem in two parts, moving backward. Contingent on selling for currency d, let Qd,i−1 ≥ 0 denote
the seller’s stationary quantity oﬀer of good i − 1, so that Q−1
d,i−1 is the nominal price in money

d. DeÞne Q = {Qd,i }∀d,i (Q0 if a foreign seller), and let q and q 0 be the equilibrium market oﬀers.

Given Qs,i−1 , let Πd be the stationary probability that a domestic seller, of any type i, chooses to
trade with someone who has currency d, in a symmetric equilibrium. Note that Πd is independent
of seller’s type (due to symmetry) and buyer’s nationality (which is private information). DeÞne
Π = {ΠD , ΠF } , and let π and π 0 denote the equilibrium strategies of all others.
As a buyer with currency d, domestic agent i must choose when to spend her money. Contingent
on a random trade match with domestic (resp. foreign) seller h + 1 ∈ N, he chooses the probability
n
o
−1
0 )). DeÞne B = B (q ), B (q 0 )
(resp. Bd,i (qd,h
Bd,i (qd,h ) to buy at the posted price qd,h
d,i d,h
d,i d,h
∀i,h,d

0

(B 0 if foreign) and let β and β denote the equilibrium strategies of all others. Finally, let q = {q, q 0 },

Q = {Q, Q0 }, Π = {Π, Π0 }, π = {π, π0 }, B = {B, B 0 }, and β = {β, β 0 }.

It should be obvious that sellers accepting the same money could price goods unequally. Thus,
several international and local price distributions can be conjectured. As our focus is equilibria
with the law of one price, in what follows we restrict attention to outcomes where same-currency
prices are homogeneous within a country. We call them equilibria with ‘locally homogenous prices.’
3.1 Distribution of money
In a symmetric equilibrium money must be identically distributed across types. We let md
denote the proportion of domestic buyers with currency d, for any i (m0d if foreign). Hence
m = mD + mF

and m0 = m0D + m0F

(2)

are the proportion of buyers, of any type, in the domestic and foreign economy, respectively. In a
monetary equilibrium, all money must be held:
P md + (1 − P )m0d = Md
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∀d ∈ {D, F }.

(3)

It follows that a proportion 1 − m of domestic agents of every type i are sellers, and m are buyers
(1 − m0 and m0 if foreign). Denote by m = {md , m0d }∀d the stationary distribution of currency.

We discuss the laws of motion by considering the domestic economy. Note that md is stationary
when the inßow of domestic agents who have sold goods for money d, is equal to the outßow of
domestic agents who have spent money d locally or abroad. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium the
law of motion for domestic and foreign buyers with money d must satisfy:
m
ú d = P (1 − m)αF m0d πd

P

h∈N

0

β d,h (qd,i−1 )
N

m
ú 0d = (1 − P )(1 − m0 )α0D md π0d

P

0

− P md αF (1 − m0 )πd

0
h∈N β d,h (qd,i−1 )
N

P

h∈N

0 )
β d,i (qd,h
N

− (1 − P )m0d α0D (1 − m)πd

P

(4)

0

h∈N β d,i (qd,h )
.
N

Consider the Þrst line. Only international exchanges appear, since internal trade does not
aﬀect md (domestic buyers and sellers just swap asset positions). A proportion 1 − m of domestic
sellers (of each type i) meets foreign buyers with money d, at rate αF m0d . The sellers trade with
0

−1
probability πd , posting the price qd,i−1
, and buyers of type h buy with probability β d,h (qd,i−1 ).

Hence, md rises at rate (1 − m)αF m0d πd

P

h∈N

0

β d,h (qd,i−1 ) 6
.
N

When domestic buyers, who have money

d, make a purchase abroad, md decreases. These buyers meet foreigners who sell for money d, at
0

0

0

rate αF (1 − m0 )πd . Trade with a seller h + 1 occurs with probability β d,i (qd,h ), given her oﬀer qd,h .
0

Thus md falls at rate md αF (1 − m0 )πd

P

h∈N

0 )
β d,i (qd,h
.
N

0

Similar considerations can be made for md .

3.2 Value Functions
Consider a domestic agent of type i. Taking as given {π, β, q, m} he selects actions that
maximize her utility from consumption. Let Vs,i and Vd,i denote the expected stationary lifetime
utility of a seller and buyer with currency d, respectively. Let a prime refer to foreign agents, and
o
n
0 ,V ,V 0
. Given the recursive structure of the model, seller’s i value function
let V = Vs,i , Vs,i
d,i d,i

must satisfy:

∀i,d

ρVs,i =
0
ρVs,i
6

=

P

∀d

P

∀d

max Πd Ω(Qd,i−1 )

Πd ,Qd,i−1

(5)
max

Π0d ,Q0d,i−1

Π0d Ω(Q0d,i−1 )

Notice that P (1 − m)αF m0d = (1 − P )m0d α0D (1 − m), i.e. the rate at which domestic sellers meet foreign buyers

is the same at which domestic sellers are met by foreign buyers.
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Here ρ = rN is the discount rate normalized by the agents’ types (since pairings are random) and
¤
P £
αD md β d,h (Qd,i−1 ) + αF m0d β 0d,h (Qd,i−1 ) (Vd,i − Qd,i−1 − Vs,i )
h∈N h
i
P
0
0 − Q0
0
Ω(Qd,i−1 ) ≡
α0D md β d,h (Q0d,i−1 ) + α0F m0d β 0d,h (Q0d,i−1 ) (Vd,i
d,i−1 − Vs,i )
Ω(Qd,i−1 ) ≡

(6)

h∈N

are the expected ßow returns (to domestic and foreign sellers, respectively) earned from trading
output for currency d.
The expressions in (5) are standard Bellman equations. The Þrst line, for instance, indicates
that at each date a domestic seller maximizes her return from trade by choosing {Πd , Qd,i−1 } , i.e.
whether to trade with a buyer who has currency d and what price to post. These actions cannot
be based on the buyer’s types or nationality (unobserved), hence the seller’s surplus from trade is
independent of h. It is Vd,i − Vs,i , a capital gain in a monetary equilibrium, minus the production
cost Qd,i−1 . The seller’s period return, however, does not depend only on the price posted, but
also on the likelihood of a sale. This is aﬀected by αd (i.e. the trade frictions), and the buyers’
strategies. For example, if the seller posts Q−1
d,i−1 , trade with some domestic buyer is expected to
P
occur at rate
αD md β d,h (Qd,i−1 ), normalized by N.
h∈N

Under the conjecture that prices in denomination d are locally homogeneous, their distribution

has a single mass point in each country. Hence, the ßow return from trade of a domestic and foreign
buyer of type i and with money d are, respectively:
ρVd,i = αD (1 − m)πd

P

h∈N

+αF (1 − m0 )π0d
0
ρVd,i

= α0D (1 − m)πd

P

P

+α0F (1 − m0 )π0d

max Bd,i (qd,h ) [Vs,i + ui (qd,h ) − Vd,i ]

Bd,i (qd,h )

h∈N

h∈N

P

0 )[V + u (q 0 ) − V ]
max
Bd,i (qd,h
s,i
i d,h
d,i
0

Bd,i (qd,h )

max

0 (q
Bd,i
d,h )

h∈N

0 (q )
Bd,i
d,h

i
h
0 + u (q ) − V 0
Vs,i
i d,h
d,i

(7)

0 (q 0 )[V 0 + u (q 0 ) − V 0 ]
max Bd,i
i d,h
s,i
d,h
d,i

0 (q 0 )
Bd,i
d,h

The Þrst two lines of (7) indicate that a domestic buyer may meet domestic or foreign sellers. For
−1
arrive at rate αD (1 − m)πd , and the buyer
example, possibilities to trade domestically at price qd,h

spends her money with probability Bd,i (qd,h ). Her surplus is Vs,i + ui (qd,h ) − Vd,i , i.e. the period
utility ui (qd,h ) plus the net continuation payoﬀ Vs,i − Vd,i , a capital loss in a monetary equilibrium.
Notice that Vs,i and Vd,i are bounded below (by zero) and above (the match’s surplus, u(q) − q,
is bounded and r > 0). As agents of identical nationalities face identical trading environments, it
7

should be obvious that in a symmetric equilibrium:
0
0
= Vs0 , Vd,i
= Vd0 , ∀i, d.
Vs,i = Vs , Vd,i = Vd , Vs,i

(8)

Although the capital gains Vd − Vs are type-independent, they are not nationality-independent,
as trading environments may vary across borders. This means that identical buyers of diﬀerent
nationalities will generally attach diﬀerent values to the same purchase, hence their reservation
prices will generally diﬀer.
The key implication is that the heterogeneity in countries’ trading environments generates price
disparities across countries. However, agents cannot easily arbitrage these disparities away due to
the presence of international trade frictions. Hence, the model can give rise to several stationary
equilibria with departures from the law of one price, as the following section makes clear.
3.3 Equilibrium Strategies and Prices
In choosing her optimal strategy as a buyer or a seller, the representative domestic agent of
type i takes as given the oﬀers present in the market, q, the strategies of all others, {π, β} , and
the distribution of money, m.
Consider the optimal strategy of this agent, as a buyer with money d. In a random trade match
−1
if her surplus is non-negative, i.e.:
he buys good h at price qd,h


 = 1 if Vs,i + ui (qd,h ) ≥ Vd,i
Bd,i (qd,h )
 = 0 otherwise.

(9)

Notice that consideration of pure strategies, in matches where there are gains from trade, is without
loss in generality because prices are fully ßexible. A seller would prefer to marginally lower the
price to induce a purchase by an indiﬀerent buyer type, rather than having the buyer mix. Thus,
Bd,i (qd,h ) ∈ {0, 1} is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy.
Now consider a representative domestic seller of type i. Suppose only pure strategies Π are
adopted (we argue that this is without loss in generality, below). Contingent on trading with a
buyer who has money d, i.e. given Πd = 1, the seller chooses Qd,i−1 to maximize the expected
ßow return Ω(Qd,i−1 ). He cannot extract the entire surplus of every buyer randomly met, as the
buyer’s valuation is unobservable. Thus, the seller faces a trade-oﬀ. He can charge a higher price
to increase her surplus share, at the expense of every buyer’s. This, however, may decrease the

8

probability of a sale because of buyers’ heterogeneity. A high price may leave negative surplus to
buyers of some type and nationality, inducing them to avoid the purchase.
What oﬀers are optimal, then? Since buyers accept oﬀers leaving them zero surplus, sellers
worry only about buyer’s reservation prices. That is, the symmetric equilibrium oﬀers extract all
surplus from a buyer type of some nationality, and belong to the set containing all Qd,i−1 > 0 that
satisfy either Vd − Vs = uh (Qd,i−1 ) or Vd0 − Vs0 = uh (Qd,i−1 ) , for h 6= i.7 This set, we stress, is
rather large. It contains up to 2(N − 1) distinct elements since (i) there are N − 1 agent types who
like diﬀerently the same good type, and (ii) a currency may be valued diﬀerently abroad.
As the reservation price set is discrete, the oﬀer that maximizes Ω(Qd,i−1 ) may not be unique.
The seller, for instance, could be indiﬀerent between two prices (e.g. see Curtis-Soller and Wright,
2000). Since we focus on equilibria with locally homogeneous prices, however, in equilibrium the
optimal price must be unique. That is, given Πd = 1, we say that Qd,i−1 is optimal if:
Ω(Qd,i−1 ) > Ω(Q̃d,i−1 ) ∀Q̃d,i−1 6= Qd,i−1
and

(10)

Vd − Vs = uh (Qd,i−1 ) or Vd0 − Vs0 = uh (Qd,i−1 ) for some h 6= i.
Contingent on Qd,i−1 being optimally chosen, we discuss Πd in a match. Due to (inÞnitesimal)
disutility from posting prices, the seller trades only if he believes money d is accepted somewhere
and a mutually gainful trade is possible. Else, he chooses Πd = 0. Technically, in a match a trade
for money d occurs only if Ω(Qd,i−1 ) > 0,8 i.e. the seller’s optimal trade strategy must satisfy:

 1 if Ω(Qd,i−1 ) > 0
(11)
Πd =
 0 otherwise
where Πd ∈ {0, 1} is without loss of generality, as prices are ßexible.9 In a monetary equilibrium
Vd > Vs for some d.
7

(12)

Suppose the seller posts a price which leaves positive surplus to some buyer, and zero surplus to no-one. He can

increase the price a bit, earning a larger surplus from every possible sale, without lowering the probability of a sale.
8
Suppose money d is accepted abroad but not locally (d circulates only abroad). Suppose, however, a local seller
meets a local buyer with money d, and gains from trade exist. Since buyers’ nationality is unobservable, the seller
attaches zero probability to having met a local agent, and refuses to trade to avoid the transaction cost.
9
If Ω(Qd,i−1 ) = 0 and some buyer earns surplus, the seller could advantageously increase the price. If there are
no gains from trade, Πd = 0 due to the disutility from entering a trade. Finally, Qd,i−1 = 0 is equivalent to setting
Πd = 0, since buyers would not trade.
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The individually optimal strategies of foreigners are equivalent (just add a ‘0 ’ where appropriate).
In a symmetric equilibrium trade strategies must be type-independent, and so must be prices:
0
= qd0 ∀i, d.
qd,i−1 = qd and qd,i−1

(13)

Finally, aggregate consistency requires:
{B, Π, Q} = {β, π, q}

DeÞnition.

(14)

A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium with locally homogeneous prices is

deÞned to be {m, β, π, q, V} that satisfy (4)-(14), the foreign equivalents of (9)-(12), and m
ú = 0.
We conclude by noting the implausibility of thinking that local price homogeneity implies worldwide price homogeneity. In fact, (10) makes it clear that the price set is very rich, and that sellers
of diﬀerent nationalities may select dissimilar prices, due to heterogeneous trade opportunities.10
4. A Simple Class of Equilibria
We have shown that the set of possible outcomes is rather large. First, prices could range from
very low, when everyone buys, to very high, when only few buy. Second, as monies are intrinsically
useless and inconvertible, several monetary trade patterns are possible (e.g. one money does not
circulate at all). Studying all permutations is beyond our purposes, so we take two steps. First, we
study equilibria where sales take place whenever gains from trade exist, i.e. sellers post the lowest
reservation price. Second, we focus on the most representative monetary regimes: local circulation
of currencies and international circulation of one or both currencies.
γ

For tractability, we assume N = 3 and ai,i+1 = a ∈ (0, 1). Let q̄ = a 1−γ be the largest traded
quantity, i.e. the one at which the trade surplus of a low valuation buyer, (aq)γ − q, vanishes.
We organize the discussion as follows. First, we prove existence of outcomes where the law of one
price holds under the diﬀerent monetary regimes. Then, with the help of numerical experiments,
we illustrate the key characteristics of the terms of trade across the diﬀerent regimes, and welfare.
We start by studying the case of local circulation. This builds intuition on the basic properties of
10

For example if N = 3, there are four reservation prices, in any currency. Two ‘low’ prices target, respectively,

low-valuation local or foreign buyers, while two ‘high’ prices exist that target, respectively, high-valuation local or
foreign buyers. Thus, sixteen price vectors are possible, twelve of which imply international price dispersion.
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equilibria where sellers post the lowest reservation price. This intuition will carry over to the less
tractable cases with international monetary exchange.
4.1 Local Currencies
Conjecture that domestic (resp. foreign) sellers refuse trades in money F (resp. D), but national
currencies are accepted, i.e. π F = π0D = 0 and πD = π0F = 1. Then, local monies are held solely
locally i.e. mF = m0D = 0 and m = mD =

MD
P

and m0 = m0F =

MF
1−P ,

only if MD < P < 1 − MF

(since at most every agent can have a unit of money).
In equilibrium a domestic seller of good i engages only in domestic sales for domestic money.
He chooses one of two reservation prices, high or low, targeting domestic buyers. The high price
leaves no surplus to high valuation buyers, and satisÞes ui (QD,i ) = VD − Vs so that trade does not
occur with low-valuation agents. The low price leaves some (resp. no) surplus to high-valuation
(resp. low-) buyers and satisÞes ui−1 (QD,i ) = VD − Vs . A sale takes place any time gains from
trade exist, i.e. in matches with agents i − 1 and i with money D.
When domestic sellers uniformly post the low reservation price, qD must satisfy
(aqD )γ = VD − Vs .

(15)

In this case β D,i (qD,h ) = 1 for h ∈ {i, i + 1}, and (5)-(7) greatly simplify:
ρVs = 2αD mD (VD − qD − Vs )
¢
¡
γ
− VD .
ρVD = αD (1 − mD ) Vs + qD

(16)

The Þrst line in (16), for instance, tells us that sales occur at rate 2αD mD , since two types of buyers
desire the good oﬀered, and local sellers trade only for local currency, held only locally. This gives
them surplus VD − qD − Vs . Using (15)-(16) we Þnd unique equilibrium prices:
o 1
n γ
1−γ
D (1−m)
qD = a [ρ+αD (1+m)]−α
2mαD
¾ 1
½
aγ [ρ+α0F (1+m0 )]−α0F (1−m0 ) 1−γ
0
qF =
.
2m0 α0

(17)

F

The key to proving that these prices and strategies are indeed an equilibrium, is to verify not
only that sellers earn surplus, but also that they have no incentive to deviate either by charging
the higher price, or by accepting a competing currency.
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Proposition 1. If ρ ≤ ρ̄,

MD
P

∈ (m, m̄),

MF
1−P

∈ (m0 , m̄), αF ≤ ᾱF , and α0D ≤ ᾱ0D , then there

exists a unique low-price equilibrium where currencies circulate only locally, and prices are locally
homogeneous.
Proof. In Appendix.11

The key to local circulation is the presence of large international trade frictions, i.e. αF and
α0D must be small. This conÞrms prior results based on a diﬀerent pricing mechanism (Wright and
Trejos, 2001). In equilibrium a foreign money has very little value domestically, if it is not used
for internal trade and its use in international trade is sporadic. This motivates domestic agents to
refuse oﬀers to sell for foreign money, so that they trade only locally with the national money.
To understand why equilibrium prices are low, instead we must discuss a trade-oﬀ existing
between ease of trade, governed by amount of money and trade frictions, and return per sale. The
conditions on liquidity and discounting guarantee that the representative seller does not prefer to
raise her price above the market.
Sellers must be willing to produce more currently, rather than less, in exchange for money that
will only Þnance future purchases. Thus, they must be patient, ρ ≤ ρ̄. The amount of liquidity
aﬀects the sales frequency since trade matches are proportional to the fraction of buyers. If there is
little liquidity, MD /P < m, sales are infrequent. Thus, sellers prefer to charge high prices, oﬀering
the lower quantity aqD . As liquidity grows, m < MD /P < m̄, there are more trade encounters
and sellers lower prices to earn some surplus whenever gains from trade exist. At higher liquidity
levels, MD /P > m̄, sale opportunities are so plentiful that sellers can aﬀord to target high-value
customers by oﬀering aqD . Figure 1, area A, provides an illustration.12
[Figure 1 approximately here]
4.2 One International Currency
We now consider international monetary exchange, by conjecturing an equilibrium in which
11

Existence is proved using a constructive method. Given candidate strategies we Þnd parameter regions where

strategies are optimal. Thus, ρ̄, m, m0 , m̄, ᾱF and ᾱ0D are positive-valued functions of the parameters.
12
In our benchmark case the domestic economy is three times larger than the foreign: r = 0.1, P = 0.75, γ = 0.8,
a = 0.75, k = 10, and k 0 = 0.25. In this case αD = 7.5 > α0F = 2.5 > α0D = 0.1875 > αF = 0.0625. The space
MD × MF is divided in increments of size 10−3 .
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foreigners use only money F, while domestic agents use both currencies, i.e. πD = πF = π0F =
1 and π0D = 0. In this case money F facilitates international trade.
In an equilibrium where the lowest reservation price is selected, qD must once again satisfy (15).
In pricing goods in money F , however, sellers must take into account the expected national and
international demand. Since foreign money can be valued diﬀerently across borders, there are four
potentially diﬀerent reservation prices to choose from. A domestic seller of good i, for instance,
can target domestic buyers of either high or low valuation, i.e. QF,i may satisfy ui (QF,i ) = VF − Vs
or ui−1 (QF,i ) = VF − Vs , respectively. Alternatively, he can target foreign buyers, of either high
or low valuation, i.e. QF,i may satisfy ui (QF,i ) = VF0 − Vs0 or ui−1 (QF,i ) = VF0 − Vs0 , respectively.
Foreigners face equivalent choices.
When posting the lowest reservation price is an equilibrium and the law of one price holds:
qF0 = qF

such that

ª
©
(aqF )γ = max VF − Vs , VF0 − Vs0 .

To pin down qF we conjecture (and later verify) that domestic buyers have a lower reservation
price than foreigners of the same type, i.e. in equilibrium
VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 .

(18)

Hence, everyone targets low-valuation domestic buyers, and the equilibrium quantity satisÞes:
(aqF )γ = VF − Vs .

(19)

In this case β F,h (qF,i ) = β 0F,h (qF,i ) = β D,h (qD,i ) = 1 for h ∈ {i, i − 1}, and (2)-(4) imply that if
MD < P, the stationary distribution of money is:
mF =

MF (P − MD )
MD
MF
, m0D = 0
, mD =
, m0 = m0F =
P (1 − MD )
P
1 − MD

(20)

The key result is that there are more domestic and less foreign buyers than if currencies circulated
only locally, as some foreign money is held abroad. It is also easy to verify three facts. The domestic
economy has the greatest proportion of buyers, m > m0 , since both monies circulate there. Second,
there are more domestic buyers with foreign than domestic money if there is less domestic than
foreign money, i.e. mF ≥ mD if MF > MD . Third, foreigners are more likely to have foreign money

than domestic agents, m0F > mF , as that is the only money used by foreigners.
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Unlike the prior section, unfortunately (5)-(7) cannot be substantially simpliÞed. Finding the
equilibrium prices, proving their uniqueness, and verifying that sellers do not want to deviate from
the proposed strategies requires a more complicated analysis which delivers two main results. First,
under certain suﬃcient conditions on a and ρ, a unique positive vector {qD , qF } exists that satisÞes
1

(15) and (19). In particular, qD = δ γ qF where δ is greater than one, and monotonically decreases
to one as αF → 0. Second, when we consider an environment where international markets are
not as well integrated as national, αD > αF and α0F > α0D , parameters exist such that {qD , qF }
supports the conjectured equilibrium.

Proposition 2. Consider an environment where αD > αF and α0F > α0D . If ρ < ρ̃, a < a < ā,
αF < α̃F , α0D < α̃0D , and P ≥ P then there exists a unique low-price equilibrium where:
(i) money F circulates internationally and the law of one price holds,
(ii) money D circulates locally and prices are homogeneous,
1

(iii) qD = δ γ qF , where δ > 1, and domestic agents have the lowest reservation prices.
Proof. In Appendix.

Some elements of the proposition reßect our prior Þndings. For instance, low prices require
‘patient’ sellers, ρ < ρ̃. Borders must act as a trade barrier, α0D < α̃0D , to inhibit international
circulation of the domestic currency. The restrictions on the parameter a are equivalent to those
earlier seen for money stocks, but more convoluted due to greater analytical complexity. In short,
equilibrium prices that are low and locally homogenous require a moderate liquidity level.
The remaining elements insure that the law of one price holds. Recall that in the equilibrium
constructed buyers of diﬀerent nationalities have diﬀerent reservation prices, as they value unequally
the same money. Although foreigners are willing to pay more than domestic agents (with same
tastes), sellers cannot oﬀer prices based on the buyer’s nationality. Thus, two conditions must hold:
(i) a domestic seller must have no incentive to target foreign traders, charging a price above the
market, while (ii) a foreign seller must rely substantially on international trade, to be motivated to
keep prices low. The Þrst requisite calls for diﬃculties in cross-border commerce, αF < α̃F , while
the existence of a large domestic economy complies with both, P > P (we note that P > 1/2).
The intuition is this. All else equal, a bigger domestic economy raises (resp. worsens) the
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international trade opportunities available to foreigners (resp. domestic agents). Thus, foreigners
prefer to keep prices as low as abroad, to avoid seeing a relevant part of their demand evaporate.
Domestic sellers, too, prefer to target own countrymen, keeping prices low. The gain from raising
prices to target foreigners would be too small, due to the limited volume of international sales.
Area B in Figure 1, supports the equilibrium described. Interestingly, it exists when the domestic
per-capita money stock is small, but the foreign is relatively plentiful (MD < MF where the
equilibrium exists, and P > 1/2). As money use in our model is the result of decentralized
individual decisions, the occurrence of currency substitution may then be interpreted as stemming
from the domestic economy’s need for liquidity services. Scarcity of money in our model hampers
the execution of spot transactions. It may therefore be optimal to integrate into the local economy
the foreign currency obtained through international trade, to sustain internal trade.13
4.3 Two international currencies.
We now prove that equilibria with the law of one price can be supported when the monies
compete to sustain international and local trade. To do so, suppose that both monies sustain trade
everywhere, i.e. π is a unit vector. Hence, there are at most four reservation prices in each currency,
that a seller could post. They parallel those seen in the prior section, for sales in currency F. When
posting the lowest reservation price is an equilibrium and the law of one price holds
qd0 = qd

such that

©
ª
(aqd )γ = max Vd − Vs , Vd0 − Vs0 ∀d.

As done previously, we pin down traded quantities by conjecturing (and then verifying) that in
equilibrium domestic agents have the lowest reservation price, for trades in any currency, i.e. Vd −
Vs ≥ Vd0 − Vs0 ∀d. The equilibrium quantities must then satisfy:
(aqd )γ = Vd − Vs ∀d.

(21)

When every seller posts the lowest reservation price, β d,i (qd,h ) = 1 ∀d, i and h = i, i + 1. It is
13

A parallel can be drawn with the extensive currency substitution that took place in the Ottoman Empire in the

second half of the 17th century (see Pamuk, 1997). Debased European silver coins (among others), spent by European
traders, were widely circulating at a premium over their specie content, without any form of government intervention.
The reason is that Ottoman markets were in need of money, especially the small denomination. While aware of the
link between availability of money and economic prosperity, the Ottoman bureaucracy could not meet this liquidity
demand (due to silver shortages, and diﬃculties with the production of copper coinage).
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easily proved that the stationary distribution of money is unique and it satisÞes
m0d = md = Md ∀d

(22)

hence m = m0 = M.14 This implies that, relative to the monetary regime with local circulation, m
and m0 do not vary if MD /P = MF /(1 − P ), while if MD /P < MF /(1 − P ) they are respectively
larger and smaller (the opposite, in the complementary case). This is because money stocks that
circulate internationally must be divided among a greater number of agents. Thus, if the per-capita
national money stocks diﬀer, opening the monies to international circulation increases the liquidity
of the country which had the smallest amount, and lowers that available to the other country.
The key result is that a ‘shift’ to a diﬀerent monetary regime has opposing eﬀects on the liquidity
available in diﬀerent countries.
The great deal of symmetry of the proposed equilibrium has analytical beneÞts. Expressions
(5) and (7) are quite simple:
ρVs = 2 (αD mD + αF m0D ) (VD − qD − Vs ) + 2 (αD mF + αF m0F ) (VF − qF − Vs )
¡
γ γ¢
ρVd = 2 [αD (1 − m) + αF (1 − m0 )] Vs − Vd + 1+a
2 qd

(23)

For example, the Þrst line in (23) tells us that sales for currency d occur at rate 2(αD md + αF m0d )
since two types of buyers, in each country, spend money at the posted price. The buyer’s expected
surplus (second line) is Vs − Vd +

1+aγ γ
2 qd ,

as he buys goods that he likes a little or a lot.

Using (21)-(23) it is easy to verify that, in the conjectured equilibrium, VD = VF and VD0 = VF0 .

Therefore, the traded quantities are unique and such that qD = qF = q where:
q=

½

aγ [ρ + (αD + αF )(1 + m)] − (αD + αF )(1 − m)
2m(αD + αF )

¾

1
1−γ

.

(24)

The following summarizes the result on existence of equilibrium.

Proposition 3. Consider an environment where αD > αF and α0F > α0D . If ρ ≤ ρ, P ≥ P ,
m < M < m, and αF < α then there exists a unique low-price equilibrium where
14

The distribution is symmetric across economies, as the number of matches among domestic and foreign agents

is identical to that among foreign and domestic agents. Since both currencies circulate everywhere, the steady state
fractions of buyers must be identical across countries, for any money. Because the world’s population is of unit mass,
the buyers with money d must equal the population proportion initially endowed with that money, Md .
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(i) both currencies circulate internationally and the law of one price holds,
(ii) qD = qF = q, and domestic agents have the lowest reservation prices.
Proof. In Appendix.

A key feature of this equilibrium is that prices are independent of the money used, so that the
currencies are perfect substitutes. This is because the currencies are identically useful media of
exchange, as their endogenous liquidity is identical. First, both monies give rise to identical trade
prospects, as sellers post prices in either currency everywhere. Second, the monies purchasing power
is invariant to sellers’ locations, because the law of one price holds in equilibrium. Thus, the two
monies must be perfect substitutes, VD = VF , and prices must be identical in the two currencies.15
While the explanation for most of the restrictions on parameters is as in the monetary regime
with only internal trade, two reasons explain the lower bound on P . Domestic buyers have the
lowest reservation price only if they can trade at least as frequently as foreigners. Since international
markets do not function as well as national, the domestic population must then be at least as large
as the foreign. Under these circumstances, however, foreign sellers must also want to keep prices
as low as the rest of the world. As seen earlier, they are motivated to do so only if a substantial
fraction of their demand originates abroad. Technically, Vd ≥ Vd0 only if P ≥ .5, as in this case

αF + αD ≥ α0F + α0D (and P ≥ .5).

Area C in Figure 1, supports the equilibrium described. Predictably, it exists when the combined
money stocks are too small to support any other circulation patterns seen before. However, it may
also coexist with them, as it is always best for a seller to post prices in every money that is expected
to facilitate internal trade. Aggregate liquidity cannot be too large in this case, or the seller would
be motivated to raise prices above the market’s uniformly low prices. This explains why equilibria
do not coexist when either of the money stocks is large.
4.4. The Terms of Trade and Welfare.
Having studied existence of the diﬀerent monetary regimes, we make some observations on the
behavior of prices. Before doing so, we point out a noteworthy aspect of our trading environment.
15

This parallels the Þnding of Wright and Trejos (2001) for the same monetary regime. In their model, however,

the monies’ purchasing powers diﬀer across countries unless the economies are identical. Furthermore, perfect substitutability is not a general implication of our model. To see why, consider equilibria where trades in a currency occur
at diﬀerent prices across borders.

17

Corollary. Monetary equilibria do not exist when every seller posts the highest reservation price.

The proof is obvious. No buyer earns surplus if the highest reservation prices are posted
everywhere. This implies Vd = 0 < Vs ∀d so that money has no value. Thus, monetary equilibria
are impossible if buyers are homogeneous and have no bargaining power. Monetary exchange can
be sustained when the price mechanism guarantees suﬃcient trade surplus to buyers, either because
they have bargaining power, or because they are heterogeneous. The average terms of trade, that
is, cannot be too unfavorable to buyers. The patterns of monetary exchange we have studied,
for example, cannot be sustained if too few buyers have high valuations, a → 0, or if valuation
disparities are minimal, a → 1. In these cases only the highest reservation price would be posted.
How do prices vary with the underlying economic environment? The equilibria presented share
two key properties. First, greater initial money stocks tend to support equilibria with lower prices.
Second, better trading environments tend to support equilibria with higher prices. This is easy to
see when either both or no money circulates internationally16 , while the analysis is not as clear cut
when there is only one international currency.
These features, although surprising, are easily explained. A greater initial stock of money raises
the proportion of buyers, in the model. This makes it harder to buy but easier to sell. Hence
money will be valued only if buyers can get higher surplus per trade. Thus, sellers must produce
more in equilibrium. The negative link between prices and arrival rates has a diﬀerent root. A
better functioning trading environment boosts trade opportunities, hence raises reservation prices.
Buyers can aﬀord to ‘spend more’ as both buying but also earning money is made easier. Sellers
are aware of this, and thus raise prices.
Table 1 reports traded quantities for the equilibria existing in Figure 1, given MD and varying
MF . If MD = .1 equilibria with local or international circulation of monies may coexist. If
MD = 0.025, the monetary regime with only one international currency arises.
[Table 1 approximately here]
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Consider (17). Then

∂qD
∂m

> 0 since ρ̄ <

αD (1−aγ )
aγ

(similarly,

0
∂qF
∂m0

holds when we consider (24), as q falls in αD + αF and rises in m.
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> 0);

∂qD
∂αD

< 0;

0
∂qF
∂α0F

< 0. An identical result

Under international circulation there is a unique worldwide price, q −1 , that falls as aggregate
liquidity grows. Under local circulation, local commodity prices fall in the initial stock of local
money. They are independent of prices and money abroad, as international trade is absent. Note
also that domestic prices are higher than foreign, because the domestic economy has the greatest
size. This implies that internal trade is more diﬃcult abroad than in the domestic economy,
αD > α0F , while per-capita liquidity tends to be scarcer domestically (mD < m0F for MF ≥ .04). In
the monetary regime with one international currency greater liquidity is also associated with lower
prices. However, qD is aﬀected by MF , despite that domestic money supports only internal trade.
The reason is that diﬀerent stocks of foreign money imply diﬀerent trade opportunities for domestic
agents. This impinges on the relative valuation of currencies in a way that we discuss below.
4.4.1 The Relative Price of Currencies
It is important to recognize that international trade hurdles do not per se impair the domestic
acceptability of a foreign money. The key is whether the money is expected to sustain internal
trade. Once both monies sustain local trade, however, their relative value is aﬀected by their
relative ease of circulation, due to their explicit medium-of-exchange role.
The two monies trade at par when they both circulate internationally.17 When money F is the
only one sustaining international trade, however, it has purchasing power lower than money D.
That is, the implied exchange rate (under purchasing power parity) is greater than unity: at the
1

equilibrium market prices, δ γ units of money F would trade for money D.18
This is perhaps surprising, as money F can be more easily spent. Recall, however, that traded
quantities reßect the reservation price of low-valuation domestic agents. Thus, a domestic seller
should not target foreigners (who have higher reservation prices). Incentives to do so exist if
equilibrium prices are higher in money F . Also, when money D has only domestic use in equilibrium,
domestic agents must have an extra incentive to acquire it. A reason to do so exists if prices are
17
18

This would not generally hold if buyers could trade money and goods amongst them (see Aiyagari et al, 1996).
Such a ‘home currency bias’ is not a general property of equilibria with an international currency (qF > qD is

possible when VF0 −Vs0 > VF −Vs ). We think it is interesting, however, as it proves that an international currency does
not necessarily have greater purchasing power than a national, when money’s value depends on its liquidity. This
contrasts with results obtained by Wright and Trejos (2001), when prices depend solely on the seller’s nationality.
They Þnd that the international currency generally purchases more at home than abroad (i.e. the law of one price
does not hold), and has greater purchasing power abroad than the local currency.
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lower in the domestic than in the competing currency. Numerical experiments indicate that the
price diﬀerential falls as the disparity in trading opportunities falls (qD falls and qF rises as αF
decreases). As the countries grow isolated domestic revenues increasingly depend on national sales,
while foreign money is increasingly used for internal trade. This lessens the currencies’ disparity in
spending opportunities and in relative values.
4.4.2 Prices and Welfare across Monetary Regimes
Because diﬀerent monetary regimes coexist, it is interesting to evaluate prices across them. The
key observation is that extending the use of a currency to a diﬀerent economy does not generally
imply lower prices. This may seem surprising since this increases the currency’s liquidity and opens
up trade opportunities. However, the trade patterns linked to diﬀerent monetary regimes aﬀect
prices through two distinct and often conßicting eﬀects.
First, given a distribution of money, greater circulation implies larger trade possibilities. As
seen earlier, this increases buyers’ reservation prices, hence the prices posted. Comparing q to qD
from (15), for example, q < qD when m changes marginally (which occurs if the countries have
similar trading environments). Greater circulation, however, aﬀects also the distribution of money.
Because the proportions of domestic and foreign buyers are aﬀected unequally in general, prices
move diﬀerently in the two countries. An increase in the fraction of domestic buyers, for example,
tends to push domestic prices down, and foreign prices up.19 Thus, the analysis suggests that
integrating separate monetary systems may not necessarily support lower prices in all countries,
and it may support higher prices everywhere.
Table 1 illustrates this. When MD = .1 and MF is suﬃciently small, domestic and foreign prices
are lower when neither money circulates abroad. For greater MF , however, a greater amount of
liquidity is available domestically when the monies circulate everywhere (indicated using (∗) by the
corresponding MF values) hence domestic prices are lower than in the competing monetary regime.
The eﬀect on foreign prices, however, remains negative. If we reduce the stock of domestic money
by 75%, its international circulation always lowers the liquidity domestically available. Thus the
regime where both monies circulate internationally sustains higher prices everywhere.
The upshot is that, from a welfare standpoint, increased circulation may be detrimental to
19

Recall that higher m implies lower domestic reservation prices. It lowers worldwide prices, when international

trade occurs, as in the equilibria studied every seller targets domestic buyers.
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one or both economies, despite its obvious beneÞts for ease of trade and the ability to consume.
Such an instance is seen in Table 1, reporting the average lifetime utility of a domestic agent,
W = (1 − m)Vs + mD VD + mF VF , and its foreign equivalent W 0 . Welfare is lower everywhere when
prices are higher in both economies. It is higher, however, in the country where prices fall (e.g. the
domestic economy for MD = .1, indicated by

(∗) ).

Whether worldwide welfare rises or falls, in this

case, depends on the relative size of the two countries.
5. Concluding Remarks.
We have considered a two-country, two-currency decentralized trading environment in which
two monies compete to support spot trade on international markets that are less integrated than
national. Prices are endogenously formed via a seller-posting-price protocol, and currency use is
the result of uncoordinated individual decision processes. Heterogeneity in the countries’ trading environments and the presence of international trade frictions may induce cross-country price
disparities that cannot be easily arbitraged away.
The central result is the proof of existence of a class of equilibria where every seller posts
identical prices, under diﬀerent monetary regimes. Thus, our study suggests that the presence of
barriers to the international ßow of goods does not necessarily imply a tendency for diﬀerent prices
to be paid for the same good, at the same time, in diﬀerent parts of the international market. Due
to its level of abstraction, ours is not meant to be a comprehensive model of international monetary
trade. However, the approach adopted provides a useful conceptual framework to study prices in a
monetary setting where the integration of markets and the role of money are made explicit.
References
Aiyagari S. R., N. Wallace and R. Wright (1996) “Coexistence of Money and Interest-Bearing
Securities,” Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 397-420.
Camera, G. and D. Corbae, (1999) “Money and Price Dispersion,” International Economic Review,
Vol.40, 4, 985-1008.
Curtis-Soller, E. and R. Wright (2000), “Price Setting and Price Dispersion in a Monetary Economy,” manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Green E. , and R. Zhou (1998) “A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices,”
Journal of Economic Theory.

21

Hellwig M. F. (1993), “The challenge of monetary theory,” European Economic Review, 37, 215-242
Kiyotaki, N. and R. Wright (1989), “On Money as a Medium of Exchange,” Journal of Political
Economy 97, 927-954.
Matsuyama K., N. Kiyotaki and A. Matsui (1993), “Toward a Theory of International Currency,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 283-307.
Pamuk, Ş. (1997), “In the Absence of Domestic Currency: Debased European Coinage in the
Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Economic History, 57, 345-366
Rauch, J.E. (1999) “Network versus markets in international trade,” Journal of International Economics, 48, 7-35
Rogoﬀ K., (1996) “The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle,” Journal of Economic Literature, 34,
647-668
Wright R., and A. Trejos (2001) “International Currency,” Advances in Macroeconomics, Vol.1,No.1,
Article 3.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We discuss domestic traders (the argument is similar for foreigners). Rearranging (16):
h
i
γ−1
(1 − m) + 2m
qD αD qD
VD − Vs =
ρ + αD (1 + m)
which, jointly with (15), implies (17). If m > m ≡
m0 > m0 ≡

α0F (1−aγ )−ρaγ
α0F (1+aγ )

αD (1−aγ )−ρaγ
αD (1+aγ )

0

∈ (0, 1), then qD > 0 (resp.

∈ (0, 1) ⇒ qF > 0).

1. πD = 1 and the low price is optimal. The seller must have positive surplus, i.e. qD < q̄ since
qD < VD − Vs ⇒ qD < (aqD )γ . The low price corresponds to qD satisÞes (15); the high price
1−γ
≤
corresponds to aqD . Charging the low price is optimal if Ω(qD ) > Ω(aqD ), i.e. qD

aγ
2−a

(which also assures qD < q̄) or:
¤
£
αD ma1+γ + (2 − a) (1 − m − aγ ) ≥ (2 − a)aγ ρ.
γ

)
The LHS of the inequality is positive if m < m̄ ≡ (2−a)(1−a
2−a(1+aγ ) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the inequality
αD [ma1+γ +(2−a)(1−m−aγ )]
and m < m̄. Note that 0 < m < m̄ < 1, m and m̄
holds if ρ ≤ ρD ≡
(2−a)aγ
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fall in a, and m̄ → γ/ (2 + γ) as a → 1 (by L’Hospital rule). Thus there are MD that satisfy
¢
¡
m = MPD ∈ (m, m̄) ∀a, P . Additionally, lima→1 ρD = 0 and 0, ρD is non-empty ∀a, m. One
0

0

can similarly show that πF = 1 is individually optimal and qF in (17) maximizes Ω0 (qF0 ) if
α0 [m0 a1+γ +(2−a)(1−m0 −aγ )]
m0 < m̄ and ρ ≤ ρF ≡ F
. Hence, if ρ ≤ ρ̄ ≡ min {ρD , ρF } , m > m,
(2−a)aγ
0

0

m0 > m0 , and m, m0 < m̄ then πD = πF = 1 and {qD , qF } are individually optimal.

2. πF = 0. The necessary condition is that no surplus can be earned from selling to a foreign
buyer (there are no domestic buyers with currency F , since mF = 0 in equilibrium), even
1/γ
(V 0 −V 0 )
is the
if when lowest reservation quantity, i.e. when VF − Vs ≤ aqF0 . Here qF0 = F a s
quantity oﬀered by foreign sellers to low-valuation foreigners (i.e. the low price).
Suppose, then, that a domestic agent has sold for currency F, out of equilibrium. Now he
can only buy abroad. Hence:
ρVF,i = αF (1 − m0F )

X

max
0

h∈N BF,i (qF,h )

i
h
0
0
BF,i (qF,h
) Vs,i + ui (qF,h ) − VF,i

(25)

0 ) deÞnes an action that is unspeciÞed, along the equilibrium path (no domestic
where BF,i (qF,h

agents have currency F , in equilibrium). However we know that if VF − Vs ≤ aqF0 (as it must

be if πF = 0) then VF − Vs < (aqF0 )γ (this is because (aqF0 )γ > aqF0 , given that aqF0 < 1) so
0 ) = 1 for h = i, i + 1.
that BF,i (qF,h

Using (15), (16), and (25):
³ 0 ´γ
£
¤
(VF − Vs ) ρ + 2αF (1 − m0F ) = αF (1 − m0F ) qF (1 + aγ ) − 2αD mD [(aqD )γ − qD ] . (26)

The inequality VF − Vs ≤ aqF0 , thus can be then rearranged as

2αD m [(aqD )γ − qD ] + ρaqF0
αF ≤ ᾱF ≡
¡ 0 ¢γ h
¡ ¢1−γ i
1 + aγ − 2aγ qF0
(1 − m0 ) qF

where qD and qF0 satisfy (17). The RHS is independent of αF ; also, ᾱF > 0 because 1 +
aγ − 2aγ (qF0 )1−γ > 0 (its smallest value, achieved at qF0 = 1, is positive). Thus αF < ᾱF is
suﬃcient for πF = 0 to be individually optimal. Similar reasoning is used to prove that if
α0D < ᾱ0D ≡

2α0F m0 [(aqF0 )γ − qF0 ] + ρaqD
h
i.
γ
1−γ
1 + aγ − 2aγ qD
(1 − m)qD

then π0D = 0 is optimal. Clearly, there are k0 that satisfy αF ≤ ᾱF and α0D < ᾱ0D jointly.¥
23

Existence of Equilibria with One International Currency

This is only a sketch of a more detailed proof contained in Camera and Winkler (2002).

Using (5)-(7) and (19), in equilibrium
γ
+ b3 qD − b4 (VF − qF − Vs )
(VD − Vs ) b1 = b2 qD

(27)

(VF − Vs ) c1 = c2 qFγ + b4 qF − b3 (VD − qD − Vs )

(28)

¡ 0
¢
VF − Vs0 d1 = d2 qFγ + d3 qF ,

(29)

where the following are positive values:

¡
¢
b1 = ρ + αD (1 + mD − mF ) , b2 = αD (1 − m), b3 = 2αD mD , b4 = 2 αD mF + αF m0F
c1 = ρ + αD (1 − mD + mF ) + αF (1 + m0F ), c2 = αD (1 − m) + αF (1 − m0F )

£
¤
¡
¢
d1 = ρ+2α0D (1 − mD )+2α0F , d2 = α0D (1 − m) + α0F (1 − m0F ) (1 + aγ ) , d3 = 2 α0D mF + α0F m0F

The RHS of (29) is positive for all qF > 0, but we do not know whether VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 .

To Þnd an equilibrium price vector, we proceed in three steps. First, in Lemma 1, we provide
conditions such that a unique positive pair {qD , qF } solves the system (27)-(28). Then, using (29),
we provide suﬃcient conditions for (18) to hold (in Lemma 2). Finally, we provide conditions such
that {qD , qF } maximizes sellers’ proÞts (Lemma 3).
Using (15) and (19), (27)-(28) can be rewritten as:
 h γ
i
 q γ a b1 −b2 + b4 [(aqF )γ − qF ] = qD
D
h γ b3 i b3
γ
 q a c1 −c2 + b3 [(aq )γ − q ] = q ,
D
D
F
F
b4
b4

(30)

deÞning a map which has a Þxed point qD = qF = 0 corresponding to the non-monetary equilibrium.
Under certain conditions, it also has a unique positive Þxed point {qD , qF }.
Because we are interested in situations in which international trade is diﬃcult, in building the
proofs we will consider the case where αD > αF and α0F > α0D , i.e. k > k 0 and P > 1/2, and αF is
small.
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Lemma 1. If a ∈ (a, aH ) , ρ < ρ̃, and αF < α1 the map deÞned by (30) has a unique Þxed point
{qD , qF } ∈ (0, q̄)2 , where:
qF =

Ã

aγ c1 − c2 + aγ b3 δ
b4 + b3 δ

1
γ

!

1
1−γ

1

, qD = qF δ γ ,

(31)

with ρ̃ > 0 and δ > 1 > aH > a > 0.
Proof. We provide conditions suﬃcient for existence and uniqueness of a Þxed point (qD , qF ) on
a subset of (0, q̄)2 .
1. Finding the Þxed point. Let xD = (aqD )γ − qD , and xF = (aqF )γ − qF . Add and subtract
(aqD )γ from the right hand side of the Þrst equation in (30), and (aqF )γ from the second.
Rearranging:

 h γ
i
 q γ a (b1 −b3 )−b2 + b4 xF + xD = 0
D
b3
h
i b3
 q γ aγ (c1 −b4 )−c2 + b3 x + x = 0.
F
F
b4
b4 D

which can be solved to give qD = qF

h

aγ (c1 −b4 )−c2
aγ (b1 −b3 )−b2

i1

γ

. Note that c1 − b4 > b1 − b3 > 0, and

that c1 − b4 ≡ ρ + c2 and b1 − b3 ≡ ρ + b2 . Thus let δ ≡
Since

c2
ρ+c2

>

b2
ρ+b2 ,

• δ > 0 if a >

³

³

aγ (ρ+c2 )−c2
aγ (ρ+b2 )−b2 ,

1

and rewrite qD = qF δ γ .

then:
c2
ρ+c2
c2
ρ+c2

´1
γ

´1
γ

or if a <

³

b2
ρ+b2

´1

γ

;

, because c2 > b2 ;
´1
³
γ
b2
, since numerator and denominator are both negative, but the
• δ > 1 if a < ρ+b
2

• δ < 1 if a >

former has greater absolute value.
1
γ

Using qD = qF δ in the second equation of the system above yields qF =
increasing in a.

µ

aγ c1 −c2 +aγ b3 δ
1

b4 +b3 δ γ

¶

1
1−γ

,

2. Show (qD , qF ) ∈ (0, q̄)2 .
³
´
´1
³
1
γ
c2
then
• qF < q̄. This is satisÞed if aγ b3 δ − δ γ < − [aγ ρ − c2 (1 − aγ )] . If a > ρ+c
2
δ < 1, the LHS is positive, but the RHS is negative. Therefore we need a < aH ≡
³
´1
γ
b2
, in which case δ > 1, the LHS is negative while the RHS is positive, so that
ρ+b2
25

qF < q̄ and qF < qD . When a < aH then ∂δ/∂αF > 0 and limαF →0 δ = 1 (αF → 0 as

+
.
either k0 → 0 or P → 1). Hence, limαF →0 qF → qD

• qD , qF > 0. Since c1 > c2 and δ > 1, then qF > 0 if a ≥ a ≡
that a < aH if ρ < ρ̃ ≡

b2 (b4 +b3 )
c2 −b2 .

³

c2
c1 +b3

´1
γ

. Notice

Furthermore, it is easy to verify that if a = a then

limαF →0 qF = 0 (since δ → 1 as αF → 0).
• qD < q̄. Recall that qD > qF > 0 for a ≥ a, and that qF < q̄ for a < aH . Notice that
αD (1−m)
ρ+αD (1+m)

limαF →0 a =

< limαF →0 aH =

αD (1−m)
ρ+αD (1−m) .

Recall also that limαF →0 qD = qF

because limαF →0 δ = 1. By the intermediate value theorem it follows that there exists
an α1 > 0 small such that if αF < α1 and a ∈ (a, aH ) then q̄ > qD > qF > 0.¥

Now we provide suﬃcient conditions such that if {qD , qF } satisÞes (31), then the proposed π is
optimal, and VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 .
Lemma 2. Consider an environment where αD > αF and α0F > α0D . Let {qD , qF } be deÞned by
(31). If a < a < aH1 , ρ < ρ̃, P ≥

1+MD
2

and αF < αF 1 then: (i) the conditions listed in Lemma 1

0

hold, (ii) πD = πF = πF = 1 satisfy (11), and (iii) VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 .
Proof. Let {qD , qF } be as in (31) and let the conditions in Lemma 1 hold.
1. πD = πF = 1. Since (aqd )γ = Vd − Vs , then Πd = 1 if qd < q̄. This is satisÞed by Lemma 1.
0

0

2. πF = 1. Note that qF < q̄ is not suﬃcient to guarantee ΠF = 1 because we have conjectured
VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 (we provide conditions for this to hold below). Therefore, we must show

that VF0 − Vs0 > qF ⇒ qF1−γ <

d2
d1 −d3 ,

whose RHS is positive and increasing in a. Recall that

qF increases in a, if a = a then limαF →0 qF = 0, and lima→a− qF = q̄. It follows that there
H

is an a1 > a and α2 > 0 such that a < a < min {a1 , aH } and αF < min {α1 , α2 } satisfy
qF1−γ <

d2
d1 −d3 .

3. VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 holds if (aqF )γ ≥ VF0 − Vs0 i.e.
qF1−γ ≤

aγ d1 − d2
.
d3

(32)

i1
h
γ
α0D (1−m)+α0F (1−m0F )
The RHS of (32) is positive if a > a2 ≡ ρ+α0 (1−m
; a2 ≤ a if ρ(k −
0
0
D +mF )+αF (1+mF )
D
h
i
0
D −MF
D
and 1 − m = P −M
(1 −
k0 ) (1 − P )(1 − mF ) − (1 − m)P ≤ 0. Since 1 − m0F = 1−M
1−MD
P
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0

m0F ), then (1 − P )(1 − mF ) ≤ (1 − m)P whenever k ≥ k 0 and P ≥
P ≥

1+MD
2 ,

1+MD
2 .

Thus, let k ≥ k0 ,

and a > a so that the RHS of (32) is positive. Since qF increases in a, and

limαF →0 qF = 0 when a = a, it follows that there exists an a3 > a and α3 > 0 such that
a < a < min {a1 , a3 , aH } and αF < min {α1 , α2 , α3 } satisfy (32).
Let aH1 ≡ min {a1 , a3 , aH } and αF 1 ≡ min {α1 , α2 , α3 } . Notice that (i) αD > αF and α0F > α0D

imply k > k0 , (ii)

1+MD
2

> 12 , and (iii) (a, aH1 ) ⊂ (0, 1) and (0, αF 1 ) are non-empty sets. Given

αD > αF , α0F > α0D , and {qD , qF } as in (31), let a < a < aH1 , ρ < ρ̃, P ≥

1+MD
2

and αF < αF 1 .

0

Then, the conditions in Lemma 1 hold, πD = πF = πF = 1 are individually optimal, and VF − Vs ≥
VF0 − Vs0 as conjectured.¥

Finally, we provide suﬃcient conditions such that if (i) {qD , qF } satisÞes (31), (ii) the proposed
vector π is individually optimal, and (iii) VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 , then {qD , qF } and π0D = 0 are also
individually optimal.

Lemma 3. Consider an environment where αD > αF and α0F > α0D . Let {qD , qF } be deÞned by

(31). If a < a < ā, ρ < ρ̃, αF < α̃F , α0D < α̃0D , and P > P , then: (i) the conditions listed in
Lemma 2 hold, (ii) π0D = 0 satisÞes (11) and (iii) {qD , qF } satisfy (10).

Proof. To show that proÞts are maximized when {qD , qF } satisÞes (31), consider Ω(Qd ) and

Ω0 (Q0d ) under all possible one-time deviations in oﬀers.20 Let the conditions in Lemma 2 hold.
1. qD is optimal. The only deviation, Q̃D = aqD , is suboptimal if
Ω(qD ) =

2αD mD
αD mD
(VD − qD − Vs ) > Ω(aqD ) =
(VD − aqD − Vs ).
N
N

1−γ
<
which amounts to qD

aγ
2−a .

Recall that qD → 0 as qF → 0, and that limαF →0 qF = 0

for a = a, where qF increases in a. Hence, there exists an a4 > a and α4 > 0 such that
1−γ
<
a < a < min {a4 , aH1 } and αF < min {α4 , αF 1 } satisfy qD

aγ
2−a .

0

2. πD = 0. We need to show Ω0 (Q0D ) ≤ 0 ∀Q0D ≥ aqD , i.e. the quantity bought by a high
0

valuation domestic buyer with D (since πD = m0D = 0 no foreign buyers are expected). Thus,

20

Notice that although a domestic seller chooses both QD and QF , we cannot consider simultaneous deviations,

since the matched buyer carries only one currency.
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0

πD = 0 if VD0 − aqD − Vs0 ≤ 0. Out of equilibrium
0
= α0D (1 − m)
ρVD,i

X

h∈N

max

0
BD,i
(qD,h )

¤
£ 0
0
0
.
BD,i
(qD,h ) Vs,i
+ ui (qD,h ) − VD,i

(33)

0 (q
0
0
0
No matter what the BD,i
D,h ) are, VD,i → 0 as αD → 0, but qD and Vs remain positive.

Since limk0 →0 α0D = 0, it follows by continuity that there exists a k 0 small enough that satisÞes
0

πD = 0. For a given P let this value of k0 deÞne the positive quantity α̃0D . Hence choose
α0D < α̃0D .
3. qF is optimal for a domestic seller. In equilibrium Ω(qF ) =

2
N

(αD mF + αF m0F ) (VF − qF −

Vs ). Suppose a domestic seller deviates by oﬀering the quantity Q̃F < qF . At this lower
quantity one or both types of foreigners might buy, but only the high valuation domestic
agents buy. Consider the case where αF → 0, when revenues from foreign sales vanish.
Since limαF →0 Ω(Q̃F ) =

αD mF
N

(VF − Q̃F − Vs ) the relevant deviation is to oﬀer the low

reservation quantity, Q̃F = aqF . Hence, as αF → 0 then Ω(qF ) > Ω(aqF ) ⇒ qF1−γ <

1−γ
<
We have seen that qD

aγ
2−a

aγ
2−a .

if a < a < min {a4 , aH1 } and αF < min {α4 , αF 1 } . Since

1−γ
<
qF < qD , then there is an α5 > 0 such that qF1−γ < qD

aγ
2−a

if a < a < min {a4 , aH1 } and

αF < min {α4 , α5 , αF 1 } .
4. qF is optimal for a foreign seller. Since Ω0 (qF ) =

2
N

(α0F m0F + α0D mF ) (VF0 − qF − Vs0 ) and

α0F > α0D , foreign sellers might choose to oﬀer less than aqF because VF0 − Vs0 ≤ VF − Vs (i.e.

foreign buyers earn some surplus since Vs0 − VF0 ≥ Vs − VF ). However we know that as P → 1

then α0F → 0 and Ω0 (qF ) →

2 0
0
N αD mF (VF

− qF − Vs0 ) in which case the relevant price deviation

is Q̃F = aqF . It is easy to verify that as P → 1 then Ω0 (qF ) > Ω0 (Q̃F ) ⇒ (2 − a) d1 − d3 <
d2 qFγ−1 . This holds as a → a and αF → 0 since in that case qF → 0 while (2 − a) d1 − d3 does

not. By continuity there is a P1 < 1, a5 > a and α6 > 0 such that qF is optimal for foreign
sellers, if P > P1 , a < a < min {a4 , a5 , aH1 } and αF < min {α4 , α5 , α6 , αF 1 } .

o
n
d
. Notice that
Let ā ≡ min {a4 , a5 , aH1 }, α̃F ≡ min {α4 , α5 , α6 , αF 1 } and P > max P1 , 1+M
2

(a, ā) ⊂ (0, 1), (0, α̃F ) , (0, α̃0D ) and (P , 1) ⊂ (0, 1) are non-empty sets. Finally, given αD > αF ,
α0F > α0D , and {qD , qF } as in (31), let a < a < ā, ρ < ρ̃, αF < α̃F , αD < α̃0D , and P > P . Thus:
(i) the conditions listed in Lemma 2 hold, (ii) π 0D = 0 satisÞes (11) and (iii) {qD , qF } satisfy (10).¥
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Proof of Proposition 2. Choose k > k0 and P ≥ P such that αD > αF and α0F > α0D . Let
a < a < ā, ρ < ρ̃, αF < α̃F , and αD < α̃0D . Then this supports the existence of the equilibrium

where money F circulates internationally, money D circulates domestically, sellers post the lowest
reservation prices, the law of one price holds, and VF − Vs ≥ VF0 − Vs0 .¥
Proof of Proposition 3.
This proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. Consider a domestic agent. Using (22)-(23) and
deÞning h0 = ρ + (1 + mD − mF )(αD + αF ), h1 = (1 − m)(αD + αF ), h2 = 2(αD + αF ), h3 =
ρ + (1 + mF − mD )(αD + αF ), then
γ
+ h2 (mD qD + mF qF ) − h2 mF (aqF )γ
(aqD )γ h0 = h1 qD

(aqF )γ h3 = h1 qFγ + h2 (mD qD + mF qF ) − h2 mD (aqD )γ .

Subtract the second from the Þrst line:
¢
¢
¡ γ
¡ γ
− qFγ = (αD + αF )(1 − m) qD
− qFγ .
aγ [ρ + (αD + αF )(1 − m)] qD

There is a non monetary equilibrium, qd = 0 ∀d. As long as aγ [ρ + (αD + αF )(1 − m)] 6= (αD +
αF )(1 − m) then there is a unique monetary equilibrium qD = qF = q, with q as in (24). If
aγ [ρ + (αD + αF )(1 − m)] = (αD + αF )(1 − m) then q = q̄, hence aγ [ρ + (αD + αF )(1 − m)] 6=
(αD + αF )(1 − m) whenever q < q̄. If m = M > m ≡

(αD +αF )(1−aγ )−ρaγ
(αD +αF )(1+aγ )

If qF = qD = q then VD0 = VF0 = V 0 and VD = VF = V, and

∈ (0, 1) then q > 0.

(α0D + α0F ) [(1 − m)(1 + aγ )q γ + 2mq]
ρ + 2(α0D + α0F )
(αD + αF ) [(1 − m)(1 + aγ )q γ + 2mq]
V − Vs =
ρ + 2(αD + αF )

V 0 − Vs0 =

Thus, V − Vs ≥ V 0 − Vs0 if αD + αF ≥ α0D + α0F , which is satisÞed if P ≥ 1/2 and k > k0 (i.e. it is
consistent with αD > αF and α0F > α0D ). If P = 1/2 then V − Vs = V 0 − Vs0 ∀k ≥ k0 .

Clearly πD = πF = 1 if q < q̄, i.e. q 1−γ < aγ , while q maximizes Ω(qd ) if Ω(q) > Ω(q̃d ) for any
1

q̃d < q = (V − Vs ) γ /a that is acceptable to some buyer, where Ω(q) =
Following the proof of Lemma 3, limαF →0 Ω(q) =

2αD Md
(V
N

2
N

(αD + αF ) Md (V −q−Vs ).

− q − Vs ). Thus the relevant deviation

is to oﬀer the low reservation quantity, q̃d = aq, as αF vanishes. Hence, as αF → 0 then Ω(q) >
Ω(aq) ⇒ q 1−γ <

aγ
2−a

(which also implies q < q̄), an inequality satisÞed for ρ ≤ ρD and m < m̄.
29

Thus, by continuity there is an α > 0, ρ ≤ ρ1 and m < M < m such that q is optimal and
πD = πF = 1.
0

The strategy πd = 1 is optimal if V 0 − Vs0 > q, amounting to q 1−γ <

(1+aγ )(1−m)(α0D +α0F )
.
ρ+2(1−m)(α0D +α0F )

To

show that Ω0 (q) > Ω(q̃d ) ∀q̃d < q (acceptable to some buyer), we follow the proof of Lemma 3: as
P → 1 then Ω0 (q) →

2 0
0
N αD Md (V

− q − Vs0 ). Thus the only reasonable deviation for a foreign seller

is to post the lower quantity aq. It follows that Ω0 (q) > Ω0 (aq) if q 1−γ ≤
that

aγ
2−a

≤

α0D (1−m)(1+aγ )
ρ(2−a)+2α0D (2−a−m)

if ρ ≤ ρ2 ≡

α0D (1−m)[2−a(1+aγ )]
.
aγ

Since if ρ

α0D (1−m)(1+aγ )
. Note
ρ(2−a)+2α0D (2−a−m)
aγ
≤ ρ1 then q 1−γ < 2−a
, it
0

follows that q is optimal if P ≥ P ≥ 1/2 and ρ ≤ ρ ≡ min {ρ1 , ρ2 } . Consequently πd = 1 is also
optimal, since 2 − a > 1. It follows that ρ ≤ ρ, P ≥ P , m < M < m, and αF < α support existence
of the equilibrium conjectured.¥
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MD = .1

2 Local
q

W

W0

0

1.4 × 10−6

.0002

7 × 10−5

.01

.001

.049

.017

.02

.015

.337

.119

MF

qD

qF0

2 Intern.

W

W0

.03

.089

1.60

1.36

2.97

.061

1.02

.364

.04(∗)

.089

5.15

1.36

7.2

.158

2.17(∗)

.772

.05(∗)

.089

9.27

1.36

10.97

.32

3.76(∗)

1.33

MD = .025

1 Intern.

2 Intern.

MF

qD

qF

W

W0

q

W

W0

.07

3.28 × 10−5

3.24 × 10−5

.002

.0006

3.03 × 10−3

.094

.025

.0001

.008

.003

.08

3.06 × 10−3

.09

.0233

.023

.473

.130

.005

.150

.053

.1

.081

.08

1.26

.360

.033

.625

.222

.11

.194

.191

2.51

.731

.103

1.54

.548

.12

.372

.367

4.19

1.24

.231

2.91

1.03

.13

.618

.61

6.22

1.87

.426

4.70

1.67

.14

.932

.92

8.53

2.61

.15

1.30

1.29

11

3.43

.16

1.74

1.72

13.7

4.31

Table 1 - Traded quantities and W are multiplied by 102
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Figure 1
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